This blog was written by Sarah Carter at Bournemouth University and was first published on the BU Research Blog as part of a series of regular policy updates for internal and external readers. These views are Sarah’s own and not the views of Bournemouth University.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although this was written nearly a year ago, in August 2019 (when PQA was last in the headlines) we believe it is still relevant as the government look likely to restart the debate again post-pandemic.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The following blog was written for a general HE audience without specialist policy knowledge to raise awareness of factors and impact a change in system may have. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour reinvigorated the post-qualification admissions debate on Wednesday when they declared<\/a> they would reform the HE system and scrap predicted grades to implement a \u2018new fairer system of post-qualification admissions\u2019.<\/em> Talk of post-qualification admissions (PQA) has been around for a long while, (Schwartz review, 2003<\/a>; UCAS 2011<\/a>), and quite recently the UCU have been pushing for PQA because they believe it penalises disadvantaged students. The claim is that capable disadvantaged students are penalised because they may receive under-predicted grades than their stronger, higher grade performance in their final exams. Lower predicted grades restrict their ability to apply to and secure a university place at the most competitive institutions. A focus on ensuring access for disadvantaged students to the highest tariff institutions was championed by Sam Gymiah, (HE Minister of 10 months, two Ministers ago) who pressurised Oxbridge to radically improve the number of disadvantaged students they accept and challenged students to think big and trade up to the most competitive institutions (claiming it leads to higher employability returns). So it is interesting to see a Conservative and Labour policy align, even if they have different solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n Post-qualification Admissions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour reinvigorated the post-qualification admissions\ndebate on Wednesday when they declared<\/a>\nthey would reform the HE system and scrap predicted grades to implement a \u2018new fairer system of post-qualification\nadmissions\u2019.<\/em> Talk of post-qualification admissions (PQA) has been around\nfor a long while, (Schwartz\nreview, 2003<\/a>; UCAS 2011<\/a>),\nand quite recently the UCU have been pushing for PQA because they believe it\npenalises disadvantaged students. The claim is that capable disadvantaged\nstudents are penalised because they may receive under-predicted grades than\ntheir stronger, higher grade performance in their final exams. Lower predicted\ngrades restrict their ability to apply to and secure a university place at the\nmost competitive institutions. A focus on ensuring access for disadvantaged\nstudents to the highest tariff institutions was championed by Sam Gymiah, (HE\nMinister of 10 months, two Ministers ago) who pressurised Oxbridge to radically\nimprove the number of disadvantaged students they accept and challenged\nstudents to think big and trade up to the most competitive institutions\n(claiming it leads to higher employability returns). So it is interesting to see a Conservative\nand Labour policy align, even if they have different solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour\u2019s plans would see students applying for their HE\nplace after receiving their A level\/other results so they can select the \u201cbest\u201d\ninstitution that their actual grades will qualify them for. They also address\nanother political hot potato\u2013 unconditional offers \u2013 Labour want to see an end\nto unconditional offers and, of course, a PQA system where offers aren\u2019t made in\nadvance has no place for them (more on this below). It also means the end of\nclearing. Labour say that it will enable students to make better, more accurate\ndecisions, and mean that are not pressurised into accepting an unconditional\noffer from a lower tariff university. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The last reason that is always trotted out for PQA is that\nEngland is the only country where a pre-qualifications admission system is used.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n There would be significant practical challenges in\nimplementing a PQA system. Universities are usually criticised as blocking such\nchanges for their own convenience. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Universities have autonomy in this area with control over\ntheir admissions processes and the right to choose whom they admit. The Higher\nEducation and Research Act (2017), states: \u2018\u201cthe institutional autonomy of\nEnglish higher education providers\u201d means \u2026 the freedom of English higher\neducation providers \u2026 to determine the criteria for the admission of students\nand apply those criteria in particular cases\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We explore the complexities below, but first, is there\nevidence that disadvantaged students are under predicted? It seems there is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n So while there is clearly an issue, what about those grey\nareas? HEPI<\/a>\nhave a useful blog. It highlights that if students wish, they can already apply\nafter receiving their grades [and increasing numbers are, although that\nfeels like a risky business especially in future when the demographic dip\nreverses<\/em>] Students can also hedge their bets by accepting a firm choice,\nand then declining this offer to trade\nup<\/a> to a better place. So it is possible, but it is complicated and it is\nunclear whether students really know how to make the system work for them. It\nis easier to just accept the place you had originally chosen (mere-exposure effect<\/a>).\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n What about other\ncountries?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n If the UK is an international outlier and comparator\ncountries all have PQA systems, are we missing a trick? They answer is our\nsystems and intentions are quite different. In the British system the majority\nof students travel away from their home to attend the institution which they\nbelieve is most attractive \u2013 for all sorts of reasons (not just\nprestige\/ranking of the university) – the programme content, type of course\n(accelerated, sandwich, traditional), employer links and employability\noutcomes, and the desirability of the wider rounded offer and university\nenvironment. Students choose and then universities select students they believe\nwill thrive. Even if we changed to a PQA system this established cultural\napproach to student choice and the meritocracy<\/a> would not\nimmediately change. So how does it work in other countries?<\/p>\n\n\n\n France<\/strong> \u2013 students\napply post-qualification. All those achieving a pass in the baccalaureate are\nentitled to go, and most do. Most stay locally. Fees are low. University is an automatic right and\nuniversities have to accept all those that achieve the pass, shutting their\ndoors only when full (and that means really full). Non-continuation rates are\nhuge with many students dropping out during the first year because university\njust isn\u2019t for them, not to mention the enormous class sizes and relatively\npoor student experience. Application\nprocesses are generally on-line, anonymous and impersonal. Universities do not need to sell themselves\nto students and there is no selection except for a small number of very\nexclusive universities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Australia<\/strong><\/a> \u2013 school leavers apply\nbefore they have their results ranking their preferences for their preferred\ninstitutions. When they results are known they are converted to a common score\n(ATAR) and the universities consider the score achieved by the students that\nhave ranked them top and then decide a cut off for acceptances. Students below\nthe threshold repeat the process with their second ranked choice, and so on\ndown the list. However, it is not working well. Those with lower scores\nstruggle to obtain places and universities are starting\nto move away <\/a>from relying on their score based system. <\/p>\n\n\n\n America <\/strong>\u2013 it\u2019s\ncomplicated, drawn out, highly selective, and stressful. First there are fee\ndistinctions between public and private institutions, and they types of degree\nthey issue. The application process itself has multiple steps and deadlines.\nSeparate applications are sent to each institution (although they can use the\nCommon Application process for certain institutions). On four year degree\nprogrammes, once accepted, students may be assigned to the entire college, not\na particular department or major (focal programme). Entry to the top\ninstitutions is fiercely competitive. Students choosing the two-year county and\ncommunity college route have a less complicated system than the four-year\ndegree schools, as this usually only requires a high school transcript or\nminimum test score. And the provision of high school counsellors (who help with\ncareers and HE advice) is patchy \u2013 private schools often have a dedicated full\ntime post, only 1 in 4 public schools have the equivalent level of resource.\nTransfers between institutions are more frequent than currently occurs in the\nUK too. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Who else does PQA – UCU\nhave a summary\ntable<\/a> for 30 countries (see pages 7-8). <\/p>\n\n\n\n So how could the\nsystem work? <\/strong>There are two main options. HEPI<\/a>: <\/p>\n\n\n\n HEPI continue: The\noddity of our system is not so much that people apply before receiving their\nresults; the oddity is that huge weight is put on predicted grades, which are\nnotoriously unreliable. Either version of PQA could tackle this, but they\nare different from one another and it is not always clear which one PQA\nadvocates want.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Exams of prime\nimportance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether it is post qualification applications or admissions,\nchanging the system would increase\nthe focus on exam results<\/a>. Last year there were calls to reduce the\nreliance on grades as the sole or most major determinant of accepting an\napplicant (including peripheral interest in comprehensive\nuniversities<\/a>). And many universities acknowledge<\/a>\nthat grades alone cannot represent an individual\u2019s range of desirable skills\nand attributes, nor their ability to thrive and achieve on a particular course\nat a particular institution. So a system which places more emphasis on grades\ncould be a retrograde step. Plus the reality of a post-qualification\napplication process means a more pressurised, shorter, decision turnaround with\nless time to consider alternatives such as interviews, portfolios, personal\nstatements, and applicant\u2019s background circumstances. <\/p>\n\n\n\n What about those students who have over-predicted\nprovisional grades? They will have applied to a higher tariff institution,\nwhich post-qualification may well still accept them (given market pressures) \u2013\nyet a post qualification system would be a starker reminder that they don\u2019t\nreach the grade threshold for admission. Much of the rhetoric for PQA surrounds\nextending the aspirations of the most capable disadvantaged students. Yet the\nmid-ability disadvantaged deserve to secure a place at a good institution, just\nas their more affluent peers do. Of course this is where contextual admissions\ncould come into play. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Contextual Admissions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Contextual admissions could [and should] still exist in a\npost-qualification system. However, to truly support social mobility aims they\nwould need to be far more transparent. Disadvantaged students can only aspire\nto a \u2018reach\u2019 university if they know their actual grades plus the contextual\nleniency that will be applied. Without\nthis they likely will self-select to a less competitive institution. Students\nalso need assurance that universities value this information and do not use the\ncontextual \u2018tick\u2019 to filter out applications. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Universities would need to clearly spell out which\ndisadvantage factors they accept and what grade\/points reduction they adjust\nthe advertised tariff by, including any further leniency due to double\ndisadvantage or intersectionality. Providers would need to provide online\ncheckers so a student can input their data and check if they are eligible for a\nreduced offer. And this needs to be transparent, available not only on the\ninstitution\u2019s own website but clear and accessible through the UCAS application\nprocess (pre or post qualification). <\/p>\n\n\n\n This suggests a clearer but more automated approach to\ncontextual admissions. However, there may be other important factors that some\nuniversities check outside of the standard criteria to provide a further\nadjusted offer, or an offer that doesn\u2019t decrease the standard tariff but\nprovides other alternatives. Of course, if contextual admissions are more\n\u2018automated\u2019 the process could be national \u2013 a standard set of criteria by which\na defined reduced was applied cross-institution. However, this is perhaps a\nstep too far. It is right that universities retain their autonomy to determine\nwhat contextual reduction or alternatives can be provided. And this isn\u2019t about\n\u2018bums on seats\u2019, universities have different remits with some experienced in\ntaking very high proportions of disadvantaged students with a strong support\ninfrastructure. And in some cases this\nis determined by regional characteristics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Speed is of the\nessence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The aspect that strikes me most when considering UCU\u2019s<\/a>\ntable of countries with post qualification admissions is that the time between\napplication and acceptance is a matter of days or weeks. This is just not\npossible in the UK if there is to be an element of selection. Either the\nprocess becomes more automated with less attention to personal factors (which\nreally does feel like \u2018bums on seats\u2019, and would less selection increase drop\nout?) or the start date for foundation and first year courses is delayed (or A\nlevel exams are taken earlier\/marked quicker). None of these options are\nattractive. In particular extending the time between school\/exam finish and\ncommencing degree\/alternative study is counter to Government aims for a\nproductive workforce (and accelerated degrees). <\/p>\n\n\n\n The knock on effect potentially also polarises choice\nbetween degree and other alternative skills\/study programmes. Imagine a student\nunsure whether to choose a traditional degree programme (with confirmation of\nplace mid-September) and an apprenticeship option which commences early\nSeptember. The timing for post-level 3 options needs to match. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Intensive Careers\nSupport Period<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Careers advice came up a lot in the press this week. In a\nPQA system where students still apply to HE institutions while studying at\nlevel 3 (but aren\u2019t accepted until their results are known) students can still\naccess careers support and HE advice through their educational provider.\nHowever, in a post qualification application system schools (or other agencies)\nwould need to be available to guide choices and support with personal\nstatements during the summer closure periods, or early autumn. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Capacity would be an issue \u2013 far more staff would be needed\nto cover all the students needing the same support all at once within a short\nperiod. And in a system where students apply before results are known\nprovisional grades are still likely to be used by the institution as an\nindicator. Even though they\u2019ll only be used internally by the school and the\nindividual they will still be unreliable and have the same effect Labour are\ntrying to curb \u2013 they\u2019ll restrict the disadvantaged students\u2019 choice of institution\nbased on what they believe they can attain, negating the intention of changing\nto a PQA system. Of course there is a watered down hybrid approach whereby\ncareers support and statement preparation would be done while studying the\nlevel 3 (and this would work for a system of post-qualification admissions\nrather than applications). This isn\u2019t really student focussed though, it just\nmakes things easier for schools, and internal predicted grades will still\nbias the student\u2019s initial choices. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Is it really the end\nfor Clearing?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour stated clearing wouldn\u2019t exist. However, this seems\ndangerous as if students applied with their results and none of their\ninstitutions accepted them then they are left without a safety net to rethink\ntheir possibilities. A PQA system actually creates more uncertainty for\nthe student. Even if they have the grades they cannot be certain their\npreferred institution will take them, and everything hinges on results day for\nthe process to even start. Really PQA is one giant clearing round, and as such\nstages would be required. If we were truly joined up vocational and\napprenticeship options would all be part of one giant post qualification\napplication system. Wouldn\u2019t that be an enormous feat! <\/p>\n\n\n\n Unconditional Offers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Labour are also opposed to unconditional offers. Schools are pressuring the Government to\nclamp down on unconditional offers as they believe that some students \u2018take\ntheir foot off the gas\u2019 and underperform when they hold an unconditional offer.\nPoliticians also believe the overuse of unconditional offers is a misuse of\nrecruitment simply aiming to lock students into attending the institution \u2018bums\non seats\u2019 and doesn\u2019t represent \u2018value for money\u2019. Unconditional offers were introduced to\nsupport certain disadvantaged groups, such as providing basic security for care\nleavers who often have to give up their accommodation before their university\nplace is confirmed. More recently, they have been accepted as valid to support\nthose with proven mental health or additional needs who may underperform at\nfinal exam. The point of these unconditional offers is that they provide\nsecurity and access for the underrepresented groups whose lives are\ncharacterised by precarity and who, without the unconditional place, who not\naccess HE or consider a \u2018reach\u2019 university. \nIn cases of accepted or demonstrated need it is feasible that these\ncould still form an early application element, even in a post-results system.\nOr if that was too unpalatable we could follow the Scottish example and provide\nsome form of guaranteed offer (link<\/a>) with a\ncontextual safety net. <\/p>\n\n\n\n How would it work in\npractice – the nitty gritty<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Everyone has their own theory about how PQA could work in\npractice. Universities could commence later, schools or a national careers\nservice could advise during the post-exam crunch periods, campus visits could\nbe undertaken during the year or in the summer period (or virtually). However,\ndon\u2019t all these aspects have an impact on the disadvantaged student? <\/p>\n\n\n\n Of course there are implications for the University too.\nPre-qualification applications form a large part of the end recruitment\npicture, and HE institutions are essentially reliant on fee income to function.\nParticularly in today\u2019s marketised competitive environment. Could no visibility\nas to recruitment levels make \u2018bums on seats\u2019 worse? It also doesn\u2019t provide\nenough lead time to free up extra resource for unexpectedly popular courses.\nAnd, timetabling (groan) unpredictable recruitment levels are an absolute\nheadache. Plus certain widening access groups, such as parents and carers, need\nto know their timetable well in advance of the start of the programme so they\ncan arrange alternative care. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At the other end of the spectrum how would universities deal\nwith oversupply? Too many students with the required grade level all wish to\nattend the university. Would universities have less choice over who they take\n(French model)? Would the university then have to rely on the personal\nstatement (time issues)? Could unconscious bias come into play? Could\noversupply pave the way for the three D\u2019s cut-off grade threshold to be\nintroduced? <\/p>\n\n\n\n There could be a first come, first served model, but this\nhas a hidden equality bias. Disadvantaged students may need more guidance in\nchoice of institution or be slower to apply due to personal circumstances.\nWould there still be an \u2018application\u2019 or decision deadline post results? <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the balance\u2026 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Many of the reasons offered for a post qualification\nadmissions system are aspects which need tackling anyway. Furthermore, the\nGovernment wants to see more choice and variability in the HE market\n(accelerated degrees, part time and flexible options) alongside prestigious\nalternative technical and degree apprenticeship routes. A PQA system swaps the\nunpredictability of predicted grades for the unpredictability of exam\nperformance, which may still not be a reliable predictor of an individual\u2019s\nsustained capability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Commentary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Angela Rayner MP, Labour’s Shadow Secretary of State for\nEducation, said: “The higher\neducation admissions system isn’t working for students, and radical action is\nneeded to change that\u2026Predicted grades are wrong in the vast majority of cases,\nand disadvantaged students in particular are losing out on opportunities on the\nbasis of those inaccurate predictions. No one should be left out of our\neducation system just because of their background, yet with grants scrapped and\nfees tripled, the system is now deeply unfair…We will work with schools, colleges,\nand universities to design and implement the new system, and continue to\ndevelop our plans to make higher education genuinely accessible to all.”<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Sir Peter Lampl, founder and chairman of the Sutton Trust,\nsaid: “The Labour party is right to\nlook at overhauling the university admissions system. The current system is\nbased on students’ predicted grades which are wrong most of the time. Moving to\na system of post-qualification applications would empower the student to make\nthe best university choice for them. We’d also like to see a greater use of\ncontextual data in the admissions process, as well as a review of the personal\nstatement to see how it could be improved.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Geoff Barton, General Secretary of the Association of School\nand College Leaders, said: “It is a\ngood idea to look at moving to a system of post-qualification admissions for\nuniversity, but it would represent a significant and complex change to our\ncurrent admissions systems. t would be extremely difficult to manage the entire\napplications process in the few weeks between A-level results in mid-August and\nthe beginning of university terms in September or October, and it is likely\nthat we would need to rethink the entire calendar. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n It might be simpler to\nreturn to a system in which AS levels counted towards the first year of the\nfull A-level as this allowed universities to use actual results in considering\napplications, and for universities to stop the practice of so-called\n‘conditional unconditional’ offers \u2013 which are unconditional as long as the\nstudent makes the university their first choice \u2013 simply to put bums on\nseats.”<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Review pending<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Damian Hinds, the previous Education Secretary, announced a\nreview of admissions practices on 5 April 2019. The OfS is expected to launch\nthe review in the autumn. The House of Commons Library has issued a briefing paper<\/a> on the key issues surrounding\nadmissions. Meanwhile UUK launched their own pre-emptive admissions review on\n22 July. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" This blog was written by Sarah Carter at Bournemouth University and was first published on the BU Research Blog as part of a series of regular policy updates for internal and external readers. These views are Sarah’s own and not the views of Bournemouth University. Although this was written nearly a year ago, in August … Continue reading “Post-qualification admissions – a good thing for disadvantaged students or not?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-219","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-policy","category-soapbox"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/219","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=219"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/219\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":230,"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/219\/revisions\/230"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=219"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=219"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lighthousepolicygroup.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=219"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}